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Publication of the first joint review of the Agreement between the EU and the US on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging data from the EU to the US for the 
purposes of the TFTP  
 
Claire Gayrel, Researcher at the CRIDS, University of Namur, claire.gayrel@fundp.ac.be 
Romain Robert, Attorney and researcher at the CRIDS, romain.robert@dewolf-law.be 
 
 
In accordance with its Article 13, the first review of the Agreement between the EU and the 
US on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging data from the EU to the US for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) took place six month after the 
entry into force of the Agreement on the 1st August 2010.  
 
The TFTP story 
 
The TFTP Agreement was concluded after a long story which started in 2006 with the New 
York Times revealing that SWIFT (Society for Worldwide International Financial 
Telecommunication), an organization established in Belgium, was transferring financial 
messaging data to the US Treasury Department despite of the European restrictions regarding 
the transfer of personal data from the EU. These transfers were carried out by virtue of 
administrative subpoenas issued by the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset (“OFAC”) 
operating on the basis of powers under the TFTP and requiring SWIFT in the US to transfer 
personal data held on its US server to OFAC for counter terrorism purposes.  
 
The TFTP was criticised within the EU, notably by several data protection authorities and the 
European Parliament, considering that the transfers of data under the TFTP breached the 
provisions of Directive 95/45/CE. In spite of these European protests and having seen to the 
sensitivity of the context of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the transatlantic alliance in the war 
against terrorism, the EU and the US agreed on subsequent interim agreements providing for a 
temporary framework for the transfers of financial messaging data from SWIFT to the US 
Treasury before the conclusion of a long-term agreement in this matter.  
 
In order to ensure the continuity of the TFTP under the conditions of a new messaging 
architecture of SWIFT, a new agreement was considered necessary. The European Parliament 
rejected the first proposal of the new EU-US Agreement concerning the transfer of financial 
messaging data for the purposes of TFTP, arguing that the proposal did not afford substantive 
personal data protection. An improved version of the Agreement was negotiated and approved 
on 13 July 2010 and entered into force on 1st August 2010. 
  
The different reports 
 
Besides the EU Joint Review Team Report of 30 March 2001, published in accordance with  
Article 13 of the Agreement, two other reports were made available. The first one was 
published by Europol Joint Supervisory Body (“JSB”) on 1st March 2011. The JSB has the 
task of reviewing Europol's activities in order to ensure that the rights of the individuals are 
not violated by the storage, processing and use of data held by Europol. The JSB mandated an 
inspection group to check Europol's implementation  of the TFTP Agreement. This inspection 
took place in November 2010, that is to say only a few months after the entry into force of the 
Agreement.  
 
A later report was published by Europol as an Information Note to the European Parliament 
on 8th April 2011 about its activities in relation to the TFTP Agreement. This Report was 
therefore published after the EU review team report. According to Article 13 of the 
Agreement, five main parameters were to be taken into account for the review: (i) the number 
of financial payment messages accessed, (ii) the number of occasions on which leads have 
been shared with Member States, third countries, and Europol and Eurojust, (iii) the 
implementation and effectiveness of the Agreement, including the suitability of the 
mechanism for the transfer of information, (iv) cases in which information has been used for 
the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or its financing, and (v) 
compliance with the data protection obligations specified in the Agreement. The reading of  
the three reports surely raises some questions regarding these elements, since one can note 
that the effectiveness of the TFTP is barely addressed and the data requests appear to be so 
difficult to assess that a conclusion on the respect of the conditions laid down in the 




Europol does not have access to the financial data sent to the US Treasury by SWIFT, and is 
therefore not aware of the overall volume of financial data transferred. The same is true for 
the Joint Review Team that has not been allowed to access this information, since US 
authorities stated that making an overall figure public would be “detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the program”.  
 
However, we share the opinion of the EU joint review team that considers that the overall 
volume of data transferred is a necessary element to assess the effectiveness TFTP 
Agreement, its implications on civil liberties and in fine its proportionality. Since no 
independent supervision is provided to control the volume of data transferred under the TFTP 
Agreement, it is made difficult to control the proportionality requirement (including the 
necessity test) provided by article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
 
As a consequence, the EU join team recommended that more statistical information on the 
overall volumes of data provided under the Agreement and the data accessed be provided in 
the course of future reviews. One can understand the necessity to protect the confidentiality of 
some information to protect the effectiveness of the program, but we are of the opinion that a 
valuable and reliable review cannot be carried out without some basic data in order to assess 
the TFTP.     
 
 
Assessment of the requests 
 
US requests to obtain the transfers of financial messaging data from the designated providers 
(at that time only SWIFT has been recognized) are addressed to Europol, in charge of the 
verification that the requests comply with the Agreement. The verification will in particular 
concern the conditions laid down in its Article 4, providing among other requirements that 
these have to be “tailored as narrowly as possible in order to minimise the amount of data 
requested.” In this respect, one can read in the Europol Joint Supervisory Body's report that 
the requests for SWIFT data were “almost identical in nature and [requesting] – in abstract 
terms – broad types of data”, adding that “due to their abstract nature, proper verification of 
whether the request are in line with the conditions of article 4 (2) of the TFTP Agreement – 
on the basis of the available documentation – [was] impossible.”  
 
One should notice that, if Europol happened to request further information regarding several 
US requests, it nevertheless approved all of them. One could conclude that there could be 
serious doubts as to whether Europol is properly empowered, under the current conditions of 
the Agreement, to control the compliance of the US requests with the data protection 
requirements. 
  
In practice, justifications has also been provided by the US Treasury to certain Europol staff 
through confidential oral briefings, during which Europol staff was not able to make written 
notes. Since the information provided during these oral briefings were of importance in 
Europol’s decisions, the Europol JSB underlines the necessity that justifications be 
exclusively provided in writing in order for supervisory bodies to properly audit the 
verification process. The EU joint review team also considered that “there seems to be scope 
to provide more detailed and targeted justifications for the requests to the designated 
provider in writing in order to enable Europol to perform its functions even more effectively.” 
This would also allow for more effective independent review of the decision adopted by 
Europol by giving more transparency.  
 
Safeguards and oversights on the searches 
 
Other important guarantee concerning the processing of financial messaging data transferred 
by SWIFT is -besides the proportionality principle- the purpose limitation principle, providing 
that processing shall only be carried out by the US Treasury Department “for the exclusive 
purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist 
financing” (Article 6 of the Agreement). 
 
Concerning the respect these principles, several guarantees has been put in place. First, 
searches are designed technically to allow only narrowly tailored searches justified by a clear 
nexus to terrorism. Second, independent overseers, among whom are an EU appointed 
overseer and one designated by SWIFT, verify (in real time or retro-actively) all the searches 
made in the database. Third, when the search led to results that confirm their interests to a 
terrorist investigation, dissemination of the TFTP derived information is subject to a previous 
review by the independent overseer.  
 
The join team concluded that the system of independent oversight over the implementation of 
these safeguards incorporated in the Agreement was very valuable. The overseers have 
actually used their powers to investigate on the searches and to block any dissemination that 
was potentially in breach of Article 5 of the TFTP Agreement.  
 
The effectiveness of the TFTP 
 
While the first report of the joint review team makes clear that it would be premature to 
address the issue of the effectiveness of the program, it nevertheless provides interesting 
elements to comment here. The EU joint review team reasserts the “operational value” for the 
FBI, but also insists on the “unique value” of the program, which is described as “the most 
important Agreement the US has in place in this area”.  
 
In addition, the report notices that “in many cases the value of the TFTP is not recognised as 
such even by the recipients of TFTP derived information, either in the US or abroad.” 
Further, the review team reports the “general difficulty of assigning a concrete value to 
information derived from the TFTP since it is normally only one piece of the puzzle of an 
investigation.” However, the ability to assess whether this one piece of the puzzle was 
decisive or not is of great importance at the time of assessing the effectiveness of bulk 
personal data transfers to the US.  
 
According to the EU joint review team report, another indication of the value of the program 
could be found in the increasing number of requests from the FBI that would demonstrate that 
the information derived from the TFTP “was perceived as offering added value to ongoing 
terrorism investigations”.  
 
The caution with which the drafters of the report are evoking the effectiveness of the program 
can appear surprising for the outsider commentator. While previous reports (notably those 
delivered by the French anti-terrorist Judge Jean Louis Bruguière) strongly insisted on the 
effectiveness of the program and therefore its value for the European Union, one could remain 
circumspect about the conclusions of the review team, which seems satisfied with “indirect 
indications” of the added value of the TFTP derived information to counter-terrorism 
investigations”. If effectiveness does not substitute necessity, in the sense of article 8 of the 
ECHR, it however constitutes one of the underlying conditions of the proportionality principle 
for the assessment of any invasion into citizens' privacy. 
  
Having considered the above, no wonder that the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs of the European Parliament, raised serious concerns. Member of the Parliament 
questioned Europol's credibility,  and considered this a bad precedent for further agreements 
in this area. We will soon discover how the Parliament will react when it will be confronted to 
the proposal of the Commission of a legal and technical framework for the extraction of data 
on EU territory. Indeed, according to the Decision 2010/421/UE of the Council, the 
Commission is invited to submit such a framework to the European Parliament and the 
Council, no later than one year from the date of entry into force of the Agreement.  
